

Message Text

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TAGS:CSCE, PFOR, XG

SUBJ: CSCE: UK DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON EVE OF WILSON US VISIT

1. SUMMARY. IN VIEW OF UK DELEGATION, KEY ISSUES FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF CSCE DURING WILSON VISIT TO WASHINGTON CONCERN WESTERN TACTICS IN UPCOMING STATE II CRUNCH, INCLUDING IDENTIFICATION WEST'S MINIMUM SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT OF UK VIEWS ON CSCE (BASED ON CONFERENCE CONTACTS AND A LONG, PRIVILEGED CONVERSATION WITH A UK DELEGATION MEMBER THIS WEEK) MAY BE HELPFUL TO DEPARTMENT IN PREPARING FOR PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S VISIT TO US.

3. CENTRAL PROBLEM FACING UK, LIKE OTHER WESTERN DELEGATIONS, IS TO CHOOSE AN APPROACH TO THE EXPECTED CSCE "CRUNCH". SPEAKING PRIVATELY UK DELEGATION MEMBERS ADMIT THAT WILSON PROBABLY DID INFORMALLY COMMIT UK AT MOSCOW TO EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF CSCE CONSISTENT WITH OBTAINING "SATISFACTORY RESULTS". WILSON DID SO PARTLY TO GIVE NEW IMPETUS TO UK-SOVIET RELATIONS AFTER HIATUS RESULTING FROM EXPULSION OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OF-
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FICERS AND PARTLY BECAUSE UK THOUGHT (RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY) THAT

SUCH AN APPROACH WAS CONSISTENT WITH HIGH-LEVEL AMERICAN EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET LEADERS AT VLADIOSTOK. OUR CONTACTS STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR CSCE APPROACH HAS BEEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO JEOPARDIZE EITHER THEIR OWN, OR THEIR ALLIES' INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY IN UPCOMING CRITICAL WEEKS, WHEN USSR CAN BE EXPECTED TRY EVERY TRICK IN BOOK TO OBTAIN OPTIMUM RESULTS. IN UK DELEGATION VIEW MAIN PROBLEM IN THIS "CRUNCH" WILL BE TO DECIDE, UNILATERALLY AND WITHIN ALLIANCE, WHAT OUR MINIMUM COLLECTIVE FALL-BACK POSITIONS SHOULD BE AND WHAT IS TO BE DONE IF USSR DOES NOT MEET THEM.

4. INTERESTINGLY, UK DELEGATION SEEMS LESS CERTAIN THAN OTHERS THAT CONTINUED SOVIET INSISTENCE ON EARLY CSCE CONCLUSION IS NOW REALLY MOSCOW'S CENTRAL POLICY OBJECTIVE. WHILE SOVIETS ARE PURSUING THIS LINE VIGOROUSLY ON DECLARATORY LEVEL, UK DELEGATION HAS BEEN IMPRESSED BY INSoucIANCE WITH WHICH SOVIETS HAVE IN FACT LET TIME GO BY AND LET PRESSURE BUILD UP. IN BRITISH VIEW NEXT TWO WEEKS SHOULD BE DECISIVE IN RESOLVING THIS QUESTION. IF SOVIETS THEN MAKE SUDDEN SIGNIFICANT SERIES OF CONCESSIONS, WEST WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH URGENT DECISIONS AND COORDINATING PROBLEMS, ON WHETHER THESE CONCESSIONS MEET MINIMUM WESTERN NEEDS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIET COMPROMISES ARE NOT FORTHCOMING IN FIRST HALF OF MAY QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER SOVIET TIME PRESSURES WERE PRIMARILY A NEGOTIATING TACTIC, SINCE A STAGE III THIS SUMMER WOULD CLEARLY NO LONGER BE A POSSIBILITY. IN THAT CASE, NEXT BEST EFFORT (TO CONCLUDE STATE II BY END OF JULY) WOULD STILL RAISE SAME ISSUES FOR ALLIES, ONLY AT SOMEWHAT LATER DATE AND UNDER SOMEWHAT LESS PRESSING CONDITIONS.

5. WE HAVE IMPRESSION FROM OUR UK CONTACTS THAT UK ITSELF HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED FIRM STRATEDY FOR DIFFICULT FINAL PART OF STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS. THE MAIN OUTLINES OF THEIR CURRENT APPROACH, AS SUMMARIZED FOR US ON STRICT BACKGROUND BASIS, ARE (A) TO USE CONSIDERABLE POLICY FLEXIBILITY REMAINING IN UK POSITIONS TO ACHIEVE SUCH "SPEED", AS POSSIBLE; BUT (B) TO BE PREPARED AT SAME TIME TO "SIT IN GENEVA TILL CHRISTMAS IF NECESSARY" TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT RESULTS ARE NOT ONE-SIDED.

6. THIS STATEMENT OF THEIR APPROACH IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBSERVATION OF RECENT UK CONFERENCE BEHAVIOR, WHERE
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THEIR POSITIONS ARE ON THE WHOLE MODERATE, BUT WHERE THEIR TOLERANCE FOR OUTRAGEOUS SOVIET TACTICS HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY LIMITED. BRITISH HERE ARE NOT AS PUGILISTIC ON SUBSTANCE AS THE DUTCH OR THE ITALIANS. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO STAND UP TO SOVIETS SKILLFULLY ON KEY ISSUES (I.E. ON BASKET III AND ON PRINCIPLES), WHILE TRYING TO LEAD THEIR ALLIES AND CONFERENCE TO MAKE RATHER SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS ON OTHER ISSUES FOR SAKE OF MOMENTUM. WE HAVE NOT ALWAYS SHARED UK VIEWS ON LATTER MOVE, I.G.

THEIR MOST RECENT FLABBINESS VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN DESIRE TO KEEP CONCEPT OF "WIDER" TRAVEL IN JOURNALISTS' TEXT. THEIR POSTURE REFLECTS THE BELIEF THAT BALANCING FLEXIBILITY AND FIRMNESS, AND LETTING TIME WORK FOR US ON SOME CENTRAL QUESTIONS, WILL SEE WEST THROUGH TO A "SATISFACTORY" CSCE RESULT, PROVIDED FALL-BACK POSITIONS CAN BE IDENTIFIED IN KEY AREAS. UK DELEGATION CONSIDERS THIS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WITH RESPECT TO FINAL STAGES OF WORK ON PRINCIPLES, ON CBM PARAMETERS, AND ON KEY ISSUES IN BASKET III AND FOLLOW-UP.

7. DETAILED UK POSITIONS ON THESE POINTS ARE WELL KNOWN TO DEPARTMENT BUT THE FOLLOWING FEW, FRAGMENTARY POINTS MAY SUPPLEMENT SOME ASPECTS OF DEPARTMENT'S RECORDS. ON CBM'S, WE GATHER, UK "CAN" ULTIMATELY LIVE WITH 100 KILOMETER LIMIT, BUT IS STILL UNCERTAIN WHETHER THIS WOULD MEET MINIMAL NEEDS OF OTHER ALLIES OR WESTERN OPTICAL REQUIREMENTS. ON BASKET III, PARTICULARLY ON JOURNALISTS, UK WILL BE PARTICULARLY FIRM. AS FOR THE FOLLOW-UP, UK COULD VISUALIZE REVIEW CONFERENCE BELOW FONMIN LEVEL AT SIX TO TWELVE-MONTH INTERVALS, BUT WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT DANISH PROPOSAL FULLY AS MOST PROBABLE WESTERN COMPROMISE TEXT.

8. UK DELEGATION MEMBERS HERE ARE NOT INFORMED OR PREPARED TO SPECULATE WHAT ASPECT OF THESE QUESTIONS BRITISH MAY WISH TO RAISE DURING WILSON VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, DELEGATION MEMBERS ASSUME THAT ANY DISCUSSION OF CSCE WOULD CENTER ON EXAMINATION OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE TACTICS TO BE PURSUED BY THE WESTERN SIDE IN THE COMING WEEKS TO ASSURE THAT CSCE DOES NOT RESULT IN A LOPSIDED DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO PUBLIC CRITICISM AFTER THE CONFERENCE.DALE

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